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JURISDICTION-A METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRESENCE AND DOMICILE AS JURISDICTIONAL BASEs-Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
A shareholder in Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation,
brought a derivative action' against corporate officers and directors
alleging that certain actions by the defendants in Oregon had caused
substantial harm to the corporation. 2 The suit was initiated in a Dela-
ware state court with jurisdiction 3 based only on the statutory pres-
ence of property in that state.4 The defendants contested this attempt
to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction on due process and other grounds, 5
1. A shareholder's derivative suit allows a shareholder to sue on behalf of the cor-
poration. The corporation is, in effect, the plaintiff, and it and its stockholders will be
the beneficiaries if the suit is successful. See, e.g., H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 358 (2d ed.
1970). The shareholder in this case owned one share of Greyhound stock. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977).
2. The allegations arose from a judgment against Greyhound in a private antitrust
suit, Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3436 (1978) (No. 77-598) (judgment of $13,146,090), and a
fine levied against the corporation in a criminal contempt action, United States v.
Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974) (fines totalling $600,000).
3. This note is primarily concerned with due process limitations on state court
jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Thus, when the word "jurisdiction" is used,
it should be understood to exclude such concepts as subject matter jurisdiction, com-
petence, forum non conveniens, venue, and the like. The word "jurisdiction" is used
in this note in the same manner as the phrase "judicial jurisdiction of the state" is
used in I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note at 100-01
(1971). A state has jurisdiction (as the term is here used) when the state possesses the
legal power to exercise authority through its courts. This note also focuses on individ-
uals, not corporations.
4. The property consisted of Greyhound stock, options, .warrants, and other rights
of the defendants worth over $1,200,000. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 192 nn.
7 & 8 (1977). The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Dela-
ware law provides that "[f] or all purposes of. . . jurisdiction . . . the situs of the
ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State
... shall be regarded as in this State." DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1975). Delaware is
the only state which, having adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, has not adopted
U.C.C. § 8-317(1), which provides that "[n]o attachment or levy upon a security
. .. shall be valid until the security is actually seized .... " [ 1977] 5D U.C.C. SER-
VICE (Bender) § 8-317, at T-135 (1975) (table of state variations). Thus, in nearly
all states, the situs of stock for purposes of attachment is the location of the certificate
of ownership. The court could have struck down this artificial situs but chose instead
a broader ground of decision. See note 5 infra.
5. The defendants argued that the stock could not be attached because it was pres-
ent in Delaware only by virtue of a Delaware statute. See note 4 supra. The defendants
also contended that the attachment procedure was not in accord with the procedural
due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard enunciated in Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and succeeding cases. See generally
Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 668, 677-82 (1975). The defendants' last contention was that the due process
clause was violated because the defendants "did not have sufficient contacts with Dela-
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but their arguments were rejected by the trial court and the Delaware
Supreme Court.6 The United States Supreme Court reversed. Held:
The minimum contacts test developed in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington7 must be applied to evaluate the assertion of jurisdiction
by a state court;8 the contacts in this case were insufficient to sustain
the court's jurisdiction. 9 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
ware to sustain the jurisdiction of that State's courts." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
193 (1977). This contention was based on the minimum contacts doctrine developed
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and succeeding cases.
See note 7 and text accompanying notes 27-37 infra.
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendants on the latter issue and decided the
case on that basis. 433 U.S. at 212. Deciding the case by invalidating the statutory
stock situs would have resulted in a much narrower holding than the one actually
reached by the Court.
6. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). "There are significant constitutional questions at
issue here but we say at once that we do not deem the rule of International Shoe to
be one of them .... The reason, of course, is that jurisdiction under [DEL. CODE tit.
10, § 366 (1974)] remains.., quasi in rem." 361 A.2d at 229.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction is defined at note 16 infra.
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The minimum contacts test is applied to an out-of-state
defendant to determine whether the local court can obtain personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. The test considers whether or not the defendant has "certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The local (forum) court cannot obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant unless the requisite minimum contacts are present.
It can be quite difficult to determine precisely what constitutes sufficient contact in
a particular case. A large number of factors have been taken into consideration by the
courts. See notes 27-37 and accompanying text infra.
8. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189-212 (1977). "It would not be fruitful for
us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer [v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1878)] and Harris [v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)] to determine whether
jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the ex-
tent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled." 433
U.S. at 212 n.39.
9. 433 U.S. at 213-17. In response to Shaffer v. Heitner, Delaware enacted a stat-
ute that treats acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation as consent to
jurisdiction in that state over any cause of action arising from the director's corporate
activities. 61 Del. Laws ch. 119, § 1 (1977) (codified at DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3114
(Supp. 1977)). In part to avoid a similar suit under the new statute, the Greyhound
board of directors voted to change the company's state of incorporation from Dela-
ware to Arizona, the location of the corporate headquarters. Consent Statement from
Greyhound Corp. to Stockholders, at 4-5 (January 3, 1978) (on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review).
Arizona permits [shareholder derivative actions] but provides that the plaintiff
may be required to give security for the expenses which the suit will cause the cor-
poration, including attorneys' fees, unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs own shares
having a market value in excess of $25,000 or comprising 5% or more of a class
of stock . ...
[M] anagement believes such a provision to be to a minor degree in the best in-
terests of the Company and its stockholders as a whole.
Id. at 4.
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Shaffer v. Heitner marks a change from a formal to a nonformal
decisionmaking process 10 when the presence of the defendant's prop-
erty in the forum is offered as the basis for jurisdiction. This change in
methodology is important in itself because many suits make use of
property-based jurisdiction. It could be even more important if Shaf-
fer v. Heitner foreshadows a general shift in methodology extending
the nonformal decisionmaking process to two more frequently in-
voked bases for jurisdiction-defendant's physical presence and de-
fendant's domicile."
This note examines the change in methodology and concludes that,
despite some drawbacks, it is an improvement over the former rules of
property-based jurisdiction. However, extension of the nonformal de-
cisionmaking process to other bases of jurisdiction is not a logical
requirement of Shaffer v. Heitner and, in fact, would not be desirable.
The formal decisionmaking process currently in use should be re-
tained when a plaintiff seeks to base jurisdiction on the defendant's
presence or domicile in the forum.12
It is not clear why the fictional implied consent imposed by the new statute would
make it constitutional for Delaware to exercise jurisdiction over corporate directors.
The statute might be said to give directors better notice that they may be haled before
Delaware courts, but the extensive past history of Delaware's use of quasi in rem juris-
diction in derivative actions gave the same type of notice to the Greyhound directors
in Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 227 nn.5 & 6 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Surely
the statute is not required as evidence of Delaware's interest. Courts have often divined
a state's interest without specific statutes. See note 33 infra.
Nonetheless, the Shaffer Court broadly hinted that a consent statute like the one
Delaware subsequently did enact would be sufficient to give that state jurisdiction over
corporate directors: "If Delaware perceived its interest in securing jurisdiction over
corporate fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we would expect it to have
enacted a statute more clearly designed to protect that interest." 433 U.S. at 214-15.
"Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats acceptance of a
directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State." Id. at 216 (footnote omitted).
10. See note 23 and accompanying text infra (formal); note 24 and accompanying
text infra (nonformal).
11. This note does not consider a number of other bases for jurisdiction (e.g.,
consent). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24-79 (1971) (cata-
loguing various jurisdictional bases).
12. This note does not examine several questions raised by Shaffer v. Heitner. For
example, will the holding of Shaffer be limited to certain kinds of property? See note
20 infra. Will the holding be limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction in which tfie property
is not related to the cause of action? See note 16 infra. After Shaffer, will a court
ever be barred from entering an in personam type judgment in a case in which the
defendant's only contact with the forum consists of the presence of property? Id. See
generally Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?,
26 KAN. L. REV. 61 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70,
152 (1977).
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I. BACKGROUND AND COURT'S REASONING
For over thirty years the due process clause has been interpreted to
bar any court from obtaining personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state' 3 defendant unless the minimum contacts test was satisfied. 14
That test evaluates the relationships between the parties, the cause of
action, and the forum to determine whether or not it would be fair to
take jurisdiction over the defendant. 15 If the defendant owned prop-
erty within the forum, however, jurisdiction could be based solely on
the presence of the property' 6 with no other contact required. 17
13. In this note, the phrase "out-of-state" will be applied to a defendant who is not
present or domiciled in the forum state.
14. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. See note 7 supra.
16. A court exercising property-based jurisdiction may, if necessary, gain control
over the property by means of attachment or a similar procedure. The court then ad-
judicates the merits of the cause of action and disposes of the property accordingly.
Several types of jurisdiction are based on the presence of property. An in rem pro-
ceeding (e.g., a condemnation action) adjudicates the rights of all the world in the
property. A quasi in rem action deals only with the rights of certain persons in the
property. Quasi in rem proceedings can be further divided into controversies which
are related to the property (e.g., a quiet title action against specified persons) and
those which are not related to the property (e.g., a tort action in which the property
is unrelated to the tort). Each type ofjurisdiction can involve real or personal, tangible or
intangible property. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory
Notes at 102-05, 190-91 (1971).
The present case is an example of quasi in rem jurisdiction in which the property
is not related to the underlying cause of action. It is coincidental that the stock seized
was Greyhound rather than the stock of any other Delaware corporation. Stock is
generally categorized as personal, intangible property. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 12.15 (2d ed. 1977).
The major difference between jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (in per-
sonam or personal jurisdiction) and jurisdiction based on the presence of property is
the differing effect of judgments rendered in each situation. A court with personal
jurisdiction has the power to render a judgment that is enforceable against any of the
defendant's property. A court exercising property-based jurisdiction only has power to
affect the defendant's interests in that property. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note at 191 (1971). After Shaffer v. Heitner, it is not
clear to what extent this difference will remain.
17. A number of lower courts anticipated the Shaffer holding by requiring that the
minimum contacts test be met in property-based jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., cases cited
in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 205. The Washington Supreme Court applied the minimum
contacts test to a quasi in rem jurisdiction case in Ace Novelty Co. v. M.W. Kasch Co.,
82 Wn. 2d 145, 508 P.2d 1365 (1973). In assessing the effect of the Ace Novelty Co.
case, one commentator noted,
More likely, however, the case represents the opening wedge for the general ap-
plication of International Shoe (and its progeny) standards of due process to
quasi in rem cases, with the eventual demise of. . . quasi in rem jurisdiction in
general to be expected. Should this be so, then, while the opinion may be subject
to some technical criticism . . . , on the more important plane of its impact on
jurisdictional concepts, it is to be commended.
Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction in Washington, 51 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 30(1975).
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In holding that this property-based jurisdiction may violate the due
process clause, the Shaffer Court reasoned that jurisdiction over prop-
erty is, in reality, jurisdiction over the interests of persons in the prop-
erty. Since it is the interests of persons that are at stake, the test that
applies to personal jurisdiction-the minimum contacts test-should
also apply to jurisdiction based on the presence of property.18 In
applying the minimum contacts test to the facts of this case, the Court
found that the defendants "have simply had nothing to do with the
State of Delaware." 19 The judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court
sustaining jurisdiction was, therefore, reversed.2 0
18. 433 U.S. at 207. Referring to the property-based jurisdiction doctrines, the
Court stated,
It is true that the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem [or quasi in rem]
action is limited by the value of the property [see note 16 supra], but that limita-
tion does not affect the argument. The fairness of subjecting a defendant to state-
court jurisdiction does not depend on the size of the claim being litigated.
Id. at 207 n.23.
19. Id. at 216.
20. Justice Marshall wrote for the majority; in addition, three other Justices wrote
opinions.
Justice Powell joined the majority opinion, but reserved judgment on whether juris-
diction based on the presence of certain types of property, especially real property,
should be subjected to the minimum contacts test. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment, but grounded his reasoning on the
due process requirement of fair warning that an activity (in this case, the purchase of
stock in a Delaware corporation) may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign
state. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Powell in reserving judgment on the question
of jurisdiction based on the presence of real property. Id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
Justice Brennan agreed that the proper standard to apply was the minimum con-
tacts standard, but he disagreed with the Court's application of the standard. He
argued that the Court should not have applied the minimum contacts test to the facts
of the case at all because no adequate factual record existed and the lower court had
not applied the test. Id. at 219-22 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). "In my
view, a purer example of an advisory opinion is not to be found." Id. at 220. None-
theless, because the majority had decided the question, he also applied the minimum
contacts test to the facts of the case. In contrast to the majority, he found sufficient
contact to sustain this particular assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 222-28. Justice Bren-
nan's application of the minimum contacts test considered the state interest in the out-
come of the suit. He found that Delaware has an interest both in providing restitution
for an injured local corporation and in regulating its affairs.
Justice Brennan also argued that Delaware should be able to take jurisdiction over
the defendants because choice-of-law principles would probably result in the applica-
tion of Delaware internal law, whatever the forum. Finally, he found that the de-
fendants' voluntary association with Delaware as officers and directors of a Delaware
corporation invoked the benefits and protection of Delaware law and thus supported
jurisdiction. He identified the type of contact that has resulted in successful assertion
of jurisdiction in the past. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (Illinois' interest in providing restitution
for an injured local tort victim supported jurisdiction). His argument is thus quite
persuasive. The weaknesses in the argument arise from Delaware's unique position in
the corporate world. Many businesses, including Greyhound, are incorporated in
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II. THE CHANGE IN METHODOLOGY
A. Formal Versus Nonformal Decisionmaking21
The characteristic that distinguishes a formal from a nonformal de-
cision is the amount of relevant information a decisionmaker takes
into account in reaching the decision. Information is relevant if,
weighing it in light of all the policies and purposes to be furthered in
making the decision, it tends to support a particular result.22 A formal
decision uses only a part of the relevant information. For a number of
reasons, a formal decisionmaker has chosen not to use some informa-
tion that would be considered relevant in determining what the proper
outcome should be.23 On the other hand, a nonformal decisionmaker
uses all relevant information, weighing it in light of the policies and
purposes at work in the area of law under consideration, to reach a
proper result.2 4
Prior to Shaffer v. Heitner, whether a court could properly invoke
in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction was decided by a formal rule. If
the decisionmaker determined that the property was located in the
Delaware because of favorable local law even though their primary corporate activi-
ties occur elsewhere. See, e.g., H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 93 (2d ed. 1970). Thus, some
of Justice Brennan's suggested contacts do not seem very strong. For example, Dela-
ware's interest in providing restitution is diminished because the effects in Delaware
of injury to Greyhound are largely theoretical.
Justice Brennan's analysis would be more likely to prevail if the business were
incorporated in a state where major corporate activities occurred. However, in such
cases, that analysis would often be unnecessary because frequently the corporate
managers and, less frequently, the corporate directors would be present or domiciled
there.
21. See Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology,
52 WASH. L. REV. 27, 28-37 (1976).
22. Note the similarity to the definition of relevancy in the law of evidence. See, e.g.,
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 (2d ed. 1972). For a discussion of the policies at
work in the field of jurisdiction, see Part 11-B infra.
23. See Powers, supra note 21, at 29-30; notes 50 & 66 and accompanying
text infra. This does not make formal decisions inherently inferior to nonformal de-
cisions.
A rulemaker might consider all relevant facts and policies when determining the
content of a [formal] rule so that it mandates results that approximate the re-
sults of nonformal decisions. A rule is formal because once it is adopted, it alone,
rather than the policies which generated it, becomes the source of decision.
Powers, supra note 21, at 28.
24. "A formal decision uses less than all available relevant information by follow-
ing a rule which screens from the decisionmaker's consideration all information not
specifically invoked by the rule .... In contrast, a nonformal decisionmaker reaches
a 'proper' result without first screening any information from consideration." Id.
542
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state and owned by the defendant,25 the court could properly take ju-
risdiction. 26 Other facts, such as where the cause of action arose, were
ignored. Even facts that would be very persuasive in favoring or op-
posing jurisdiction in the particular case were not used in the deci-
sionmaking process.
The new process is much less formal. In the future, meeting a
jurisdictional objection will require inquiry into an extremely large
base of facts. In addition to situs and ownership of the property, all
the considerations that are part of the minimum contacts test as ap-
plied to in personam jurisdiction will be used in determining whether
jurisdiction is proper. The added factors include (1) the location of
the acts that gave rise to the suit, 27 (2) the location of foreseeable con-
sequences of the acts, 28 (3) the parties' other (perhaps unrelated) con-
tacts with the forum state,29 (4) the multistate nature of the parties, 30
25. Ownership and situs of property are not always easy to determine. Situs has
been especially troublesome in several situations. See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379
U.S. 674 (1965). When the situs is not clear, the seemingly rigid formal rule is diffi-
cult to apply and is subject to manipulation, which can allow a court to achieve a
proper result using other relevant information. In such cases, the decisionmaking
process, although nominally formal, will more closely resemble a nonformal process.
This type of manipulation would have occurred in Shaffer v. Heitner if the Supreme
Court had covertly applied the minimum contacts test, found the contacts inadequate,
and then simply stated, without revealing its minimum contacts analysis, that the
stock in question was not located in Delaware.
26. "Some limitations may be imposed by the Constitution upon the power of a
State of the United States to exercise judicial jurisdiction against chattels within its
territory that are in transit in interstate or foreign commerce." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 56, Comment a (1971). Courts usually decline jurisdiction if
fraud or coercion is used to bring the property within the territory of the court. Id.
§ 60, Comment d.
27. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ("The cause of action in
this case is not one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the
forum State."); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
(" [t] he contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there").
28. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) (in a tort action involving a product manufactured in
Ohio, incorporated into a water heater in Pennsylvania, and sold to an Illinois con-
sumer, the court noted that the product was "presumably sold in contemplation of
use here").
29. E.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952) (Ohio
had jurisdiction over a foreign corporation even though "the cause of action arose
from activities entirely distinct from [the corporation's] activities in Ohio"); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969)
(sales to unrelated third party).
30. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (defendant in-
surance company did business in at least two states; plaintiff was a resident of Cali-
fornia with no apparent multistate activity); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342
P.2d 871, 875 (1959) (court compared the position of a mail-order sales business that
accepts orders from all over the country with the position of an individual customer
who presumably would engage in no similar multistate activities).
543
Washington Law Review
(5) the initiator of the transaction leading to the suit,3 1 (6) the incon-
venience of litigating in a remote forum,32 (7) the forum state's
interest in the suit 33 and the nature of the interest, 34 (8) the benefits
received from the contacts with the forum state,35 (9) the availability
of an alternative forum, 36 and (10) the possibility of multiple conflict-
ing suits. 37
The new process is not, however, completely nonformal. Some
facts that in the past have not been used under the minimum contacts
test presumably will still be excluded. For example, the distance from
the defendant's residence to the forum will not be considered, yet an
argument could easily be made that it should be part of the minimum
contacts analysis. An out-of-state defendant living close to the forum
will generally find it less burdensome to litigate there than a defen-
31. E.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871, 874 (1959) ("[ilt is
important to bear in mind that it was not the defendant Utah resident who took the
initiative by going into Illinois to transact business").
32. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317 ("An 'estimate of
the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its
'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.").
33. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("It
cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means
of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims."); Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969)
(" [the forum state] also has an interest, from the standpoint of the orderly administra-
tion of the laws, in assuming jurisdiction in cases . . . where prevailing choice of law
principles dictate the application of local law"). The latter state interest has been the
subject of debate. Compare, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215 with id. at 224-26 (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
34. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958). The Court considered
California's interest in the earlier case of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), noting that the insurers in that case "engaged in an activity that
[California] treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation." That interest
was contrasted to the presumably lesser interest that Florida had in the case under
consideration. "The first relationship Florida had to the agreement was years later ......
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252.
35. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319 ('"To the extent
that a corporation exercises the privileges of conducting activities within a state, it
enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.").
36. It seems likely that the Court, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
(Florida judgment reversed for lack of jurisdiction; Delaware judgment in a case in-
volving the same facts affirmed), was influenced by the ready availability of Delaware
as an alternate forum. Id. at 259 n.3 (Black, J., dissenting). The only obvious alternate
forum in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), was the Philip-
pines. This may have influenced the Court to vacate the Ohio judgment which struck
down that state's jurisdiction.
37. E.g., Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960, 966 (1957)
("evil of exposing the obligor to actions to enforce the same obligation in two juris-
dictions with the attendant risk of double liability"). Similarly, if multiple defendants
are involved, each could avoid liability by pointing to the other if separate actions in
different states are required.
544
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dant residing a great distance from the forum.3 8 Another example
could be posed in terms of a hypothetical lawsuit involving an out-of-
state defendant whose sister is a lawyer living next door to the forum
courthouse. The existence of the sister might substantially reduce the
inconvenience of defending an action in the remote forum, but most
would agree that this fact should be excluded from the determination
of jurisdiction. Perhaps the discomfort that most would feel in using
such a personal fact to arrive at a legal decision reveals the underlying
formal nature of law. Almost by definition, a rule of law must be
somewhat general in application and therefore somewhat formal.
B. A "Correct" Result
As the term is used in this note, a "correct" result in a particular de-
cision is the result the decisionmaker would reach by considering all
relevant information. 39 However, relevance has been defined by refer-
ence to the policies and purposes at work in the area of law under
consideration. 40 Thus, in order to determine what constitutes a "cor-
rect" result in a jurisdictional dispute, it is necessary to analyze the
policies which are to be furthered by the concept of jurisdiction.
Fundamental fairness is the purpose articulated by modern courts
in applying jurisdictional concepts to out-of-state defendants. 41 It is a
policy of recent origin42-- older cases dealt with jurisdiction in a more
38. Federal courts may join certain parties living withifi 100 miles of the court
without regard to intervening state boundary lines. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). "In light of
present-day facilities for communication and travel, the territorial range of the service
allowed ... can hardly work hardship on the parties summoned." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0,
Advisory Committee Notes on 1963 Amendments.
39. Note that the "correct" result is the result which is obtained by applying a
totally nonformal decisionmaking process.
40. See text accompanying note 22 supra. Disagreement over policy, which can be
viewed as disagreement as to what information is relevant, will produce disagreement
over what constitutes a "correct" result.
41. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ("traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice"). Fairness to the defendant is not a well-
focused purpose or policy. Presumably one purpose of all legal concepts is fairness to
the parties. A definition of fairness in jurisdictional disputes, however, would simply
amount to a recitation of the numerous factors taken into account in the* minimum
contacts test, and thus would not be useful. See notes 27-37 and accompanying text
supra. The Restatement considers whether taking jurisdiction would be "reasonable,"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1971), but "reasonableness"
resembles "fairness" in its lack of focus.
42. Fairness was firmly fixed in jurisdictional doctrine in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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mechanistic manner.43 Earlier courts emphasized that the states are
sovereign entities that could rightfully exercise control through their
courts over people and property within their boundaries. An attempt
to control people and property in another state, however, was consid-
ered an infringement of that state's sovereignty. 44
This view of jurisdiction retains some validity today, 45 especially
with respect to presence and domicile as jurisdictional bases, 46 even
after the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner. The Shaffer Court did not
hold that jurisdiction based on the presence or domicile of the defen-
dant must be subjected to the minimum contacts test. 47 The Court
43. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
44. States were analogized to nations. A nation can control people and property
within its borders because the nation has the physical power to do so. For example, a
defendant can be physically seized, arrested, and put in jail. But repeated attempts by
one nation to control people and property in another nation would generally lead to
hostility between nations.
45. In a case decided recently, the Supreme Court relied in part on concepts of
sovereignty in striking down a state court order restraining pretrial publicity. "The
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court is limited by concepts of sovereignty ......
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
46. In defining when a state may properly take jurisdiction, the Restatement often
reflects the fundamental fairness policy by requiring reasonableness. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 27-52, 59-68 (1971). But the Restatement does
not require reasonableness when the jurisdictional basis is presence, id. § 28, or
domicile, id. § 29.
With respect to presence, the Restatement notes that "[iut can also be contended
that the rule [that physical presence is a basis for jurisdiction] is inconsistent with the
basic principle of reasonableness which underlies the field of jurisdiction." Id. § 28,
Comment a. The Restatement does not explain why presence should not be subject to
a requirement of reasonableness. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark.
1959) (defendant flying over the state in an airplane considered "present" in the
state for jurisdictional purposes) is an example of a valid exercise of jurisdiction
based on presence that would not have passed a reasonableness test.
With respect to domicile, the Restatement simply states that "[a] person's domicil
in a state is a fair and reasonable basis upon which to ground his amenability to suit
there." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29, Comment a (1971). But
cases can be imagined in which this would not be true. Assume, for example, that New
York was a person's domicile of origin. Assume further that the person had spent the
last 20 years traveling up and down the west coast (never staying long in one place)
and was therefore prevented from acquiring a domicile of choice. New York would
be the person's domicile in such a case and it would probably be unfair for a New
York court to base jurisdiction on the person's domicile. (The hypothetical case, al-
though somewhat far fetched, is not much more so than the actual facts of Grace v.
MacArthur).
47. The Court's statement that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny,"
433 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted), would support an argument to the contrary, but
such an argument would be unsound. The various bases of jurisdiction are certainly
well-known to the Court. Although one section of the majority opinion is devoted to
the historical development of jurisdiction in general, 433 U.S. at 196-206. the facts of
the case involved only jurisdiction based on the presence of property. More impor-
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held only that the minimum contacts test must be used when a plain-
tiff seeks to base jurisdiction on the presence of property.
Thus a "correct" result in a dispute over jurisdiction is a result
which is consistent with considerations of both fairness and sover-
eignty. This understanding will aid in evaluating whether or not the
change in methodology in Shaffer v. Heitner is an improvement over
previous methodology.
C. The Detriments of the Formal Rule48
There are two ways in which application of a formal rule can lead
to "incorrect" results. First, a formal rule can, in an individual case,
yield a result which is inconsistent with the policies that were origi-
nally at work when the formal rule was developed. 49 This can happen
because the formal rule excludes relevant information.5 0
An example of'this problem would occur in the present context if
the rules of property-based jurisdiction gave a result inconsistent with
the notions of sovereignty that gave rise to the rules.5 1 Although the
Court did not analyze Shaffer v. Heitner in these terms, it could be
argued that a decision to sustain Delaware's jurisdiction would have
violated sovereignty considerations. To uphold Delaware's assertion
that it can take jurisdiction over any case in which the defendant owns
stock in a Delaware corporation would give the courts of that state an
enormous reach not enjoyed by other state courts.
tantly, the Court restricted its analysis to that subject. Indeed, two Justices expressed
the opinion that Shaffer v. Heitner should not be read to include all types of property.
See note 20 supra. Therefore the narrower, and arguably more accurate, interpretation
is that the case does not encompass any bases for jurisdiction other than property-
based jurisdiction.
48. The problem of "incorrect" results noted in the text of this section is the
major detriment that arises from the application of formal rules, but other detriments
exist. For example, "the mechanical application of formal rules can be perceived as
an undignified, subservient task." Powers, supra note 21, at 32.
49. This has been termed the "mapping problem." Id. at 30. "[R] ules do not
always translate (map) perfectly the policies which generated them into results in
individual cases." Id. at 31.
50. "By its very nature, a formal rule excludes relevant information* from the
decisionmaking process, raising the possibility that the rule will produce a result in
an individual case contrary to that supported by the policies which underlie the rule."
Id.
51. One way to eliminate mapping problems is to discard the formal decision-
making process and adopt a nonformal process. Nevertheless, the "incorrect" result
reached by the lower courts in Shaffer v. Heitner could have been corrected by re-
taining the formal property-based rules of jurisdiction but invalidating the statutory
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The second way in which formal rules can lead to "incorrect" re-
sults occurs when the values of the society change over time. Rules
based on the policies of an earlier time may not reflect the policies
considered important today. A decision that was "correct" by yester-
day's standards may seem "incorrect" by today's standards. 52 The for-
mal rules of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were clearly subject
to this problem. The present policy of fairness to defendants was not
recognized as a primary consideration when the rules of property-
based jurisdiction were being developed.53 The Shaffer Court con-
cluded that, by today's standards, application of the formal rules of
quasi in rem jurisdiction would yield an "incorrect" result.54 The con-
sequences of this "incorrect" conclusion prompted the Court to
change to the nonformal minimum contacts test.
The severity of the problem caused by the recognition of a new so-
cietal value, namely, fairness to the defendant, is amplified by other
changes in society which have occurred since the time of Pennoyer v.
Neff.55 Courts did not have to scrutinize fairness to the defendant too
closely at the time of Pennoyer because the number of cases in which
application of the formal rules of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
yielded an unfair result was relatively small. However, increasing mo-
bility and an increase in the amount and variety of movable prop-
erty56 make the potential for unfair results under the formal rules
much greater today than it was 75 or 100 years ago. 57
D. The Benefits of the Formal Rule58
One advantage of formal rules is that they are more likely to be
stock situs. Thus, the mapping problem was not the determinative factor in the Court's
decision to change from a formal to a nonformal decisionmaking process.
52. This is one aspect of what has been termed the "freezing problem." Powers,
supra note 21, at 31-32.
53. See generally notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
54. See 433 U.S. at 207-12.
55. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). The problem of changing fact patterns is another aspect
of the "freezing problem." Powers, supra note 21, at 31-32.
56. The present widespread ownership of stock in Delaware corporations must
have influenced the Shaffer Court. It clearly influenced Justice Stevens. 433 U.S. at
218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57. In describing the history of jurisdiction, the Court noted how the advent of
the automobile and the increase in multistate corporate activities spurred the adop-
tion of the minimum contacts test. Id. at 202-04.
58. The advantages noted in the text of this section comprise the major benefits of
formal rules, but other benefits exist. For example, formal rules "help rulemakers
transmit their values by controlling decisionmakers who might not be trusted." Powers,
supra note 21, at 29-30.
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predictable than their nonformal counterparts. 59 In the field of juris-
diction, predictability is very important to both plaintiffs and defen-
dants. A plaintiff generally does not come into court to litigate juris-
dictional matters; her goal is to resolve the underlying claim. The
delay caused by a jurisdictional challenge can work a substantial
hardship on a plaintiff with a valid cause of action. In addition, if the
jurisdictional decisionmaking process is not predictable, a plaintiff
may be caught in the following unpleasant predicament. A plaintiff
prosecutes an action to final judgment only to find out later that the
court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. 60 The judgment is
useless and, in addition to the time and money wasted by the plaintiff
and the court, the plaintiff's cause of action may be lost forever by
reason of the statute of limitations.61 Only plaintiffs who can predict
the outcome of a jurisdictional challenge can select an initial forum
with confidence.
Predictability is important to defendants, too. If a defendant does
not know whether a remote forum can properly obtain jurisdiction
over him, prudence dictates that he litigate the question in the remote
forum.62 Even if the defendant prevails and the court does not take
jurisdiction, his victcry will be costly. Indeed the very evil that the
concept of jurisdiction was designed to prevent-litigation in an un-
fairly remote forum-will have occurred. It is the unpredictable na-
59. Predictability is important to allow planning of conduct prior to litigation
(perhaps to avoid the litigation) and to enable parties to plan during litigation. Id. at 29.
60. This situation can arise because judgments are subject to attack if the court
granting the judgment lacked jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 104 (1971). The concept of res judicata prevents successful attack if thejurisdictional question has been previously adjudicated either in the original court or
in some other court. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (193 1).
By appearing in the original court to contest the merits of the cause of action, the
defendant, in effect, waives jurisdictional (as the term is used in this note-see note 3
supra) objections. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33 (1971).
61. Practically speaking, a statute of limitations can be a factor in several situa-
tions: If the action is commenced shortly before the statute runs, if the statute of
limitations in the original state is longer than the statutes in other states, or if the
plaintiff delays in attempting to enforce the original judgment. The clogged court
system might often impose delays that could make the statute of limitations an im-
portant factor, especially if an appeal is involved in deciding the collateral attack on
jurisdiction.
62. If the defendant stays home and does not litigate the jurisdictional question,
the court may enter a default judgment against him on the merits of plaintiff's cause
of action. That judgment can be attacked by arguing that the court rendering the
judgment was without jurisdiction. But if the attack fails (i.e., it is determined that
jurisdiction was proper), the defendant has lost any defense he might have had on
the merits of the claim. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 69-70
(1971).
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ture of the decisionmaking process that makes this unjust result possi-
ble. Only defendants who can predict with some certainty that a
remote forum's jurisdiction will not be upheld can safely ignore a
summons from that forum. 63
The formal property-based rules generally lead to quite predictable
jurisdictional decisions, but this is not always true. Intangible prop-
erty creates problems in applying the rules. Disputes over what consti-
tutes attachable property64 and where certain property is located 65 de-
crease the predictability of the rules.
Another benefit of formal rules is that they can simplify the task of
the court and the parties. Trial or appeal is generally easier under a
formal rule than under a nonformal counterpart because the formal
rule operates on fewer facts. 66 Ownership and situs are the only facts
used in the formal property-based rules, whereas the minimum con-
tacts test takes many factors into account.
E. Formal Property-Based Rules Versus the Nonformal Minimum
Contacts Test
What is at stake in a jurisdictional conflict is quite fundamental. By
definition, an "incorrect" decision results in unfairness to the defen-
dant, violations of sovereignty considerations, or both. An "incorrect"
decision may force a person to defend a suit that she would not other-
wise have to defend. 67 More often, however, an "incorrect" decision
63. Even a predictable rule would require some defendants to travel to other
states (those who can predict that the other state may properly assert jurisdiction).
but a frequently unpredictable process based on identical policies would require even
more defendants to travel (those described above plus those who are unable to pre-
dict).
64. The conclusion of New York courts that an insurer's obligation to defend the
insured is a debt subject to attachment, Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), was certainly somewhat unexpected and has been sub-ject to criticism. E.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 62, at 147.
65. See note 25 supra.
66. "[Formal rules] are easier to apply because the limited scope of information
is more manageable." Powers, supra note 21, at 29. One commentator has traced the
burden placed on the courts when complex decisionmaking processes replace simpler
rules. J.P. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 85-110 (1969).
67. An example of such a situation would occur if the state that improperly tookjurisdiction (State A) is the only state that recognizes the cause of action in question.
A more pragmatic example would occur if the plaintiff would not sue in any state
other than State A for reasons of cost, convenience, or unfavorable substantive or
procedural law. (Note that plaintiff's cost or inconvenience does not justify juris-
diction in State A. Assuming that State A's decision to take jurisdiction is "incorrect"
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only places the suit in the wrong forum, one in which litigation un-
fairly burdens the defendant.68
A court properly applying the minimum contacts test will come to
fewer "incorrect" results than a court applying the property-based
rules in jurisdictional disputes because the minimum contacts test
takes nearly all relevant facts into account. 69 In addition, as has been
noted, the nature of modem society makes it likely that formal rules
will yield "incorrect" results.70 This consideration weighs quite heav-
ily in favor of using the nonformal process.
On the other hand, under the minimum contacts test it will some-
times be very difficult to predict the outcome of a jurisdictional chal-
lenge.71 In addition, applying the test can be a complex task. The type
of facts involved makes the property-based rules simpler and more
predictable than the minimum contacts analysis. Ownership and, with
some exceptions,72 situs of property are "hard" facts, relatively easy
to prove. But proving a state's interest or foreseeability can be much
more difficult. 73 Such facts are "soft" facts, in themselves the source
of much disagreement.7 4 Two other aspects of the minimum contacts
test contribute to its lack of predictability and simplicity: the large
number of facts that are considered75 and the ever-present possibility
that a court will discover that a new type of fact is important.76
means that, even with those factors taken into account, it would be unfair to subject
the defendant to the jurisdiction of State A.).
68. The defendants in Shaffer v. Heitner may well have to defend against the
same claim in another state. The possible states that may be able to assert jurisdiction
over the defendants include Oregon (the location of the alleged misconduct), Arizona
(the location of Greyhound's corporate headquarters), and the states where the de-
fendants are domiciled or present. If the plaintiff persists, the defendants' victory in
Shaffer may be only temporary. But the next suit might be brought in a forum more
convenient to the defendants or the plaintiff might run short of attorney's fees.
From the defendants' point of view, there are other ill effects (beyond inconvenience
and cost) that could be caused by an "incorrect" decision. The procedural or sub-
stantive law applied by the wrong forum could be less favorable than the law in
the right forum.
69. But see text accompanying note 38 supra.
70. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
71. The difference of opinion among the Justices in the application of the minimum
contacts test to the facts of Shaffer v. Heitner is a good example. See note 20 supra.
72. See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
73. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 33-34 supra (state interest) and not6 28 supra
(foreseeability).
74. Decisions based on "soft" facts are also more subject to manipulation by the
decisionmaker. See note 25 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 27-37 supra.
76. The International Life Insurance Company was probably surprised to find
the Supreme Court relying, in part, on California's interest in providing a forum for
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The balance between the formal and nonformal processes seems to
be much closer than the Court indicated in its brief analysis of the
question; 77 nonetheless, the Court's result seems correct. On balance,
the simplicity and predictability offered by formal rules do not
outweigh the fewer "incorrect" results offered by the nonformal pro-
cess. Elimination of formal rules of property-based jurisdiction leaves
other bases of jurisdiction-physical presence and domicile, for ex-
ample-still subject to formal rules.78 Thus a plaintiff with a case that
might be unpredictable under the minimum contacts test can elimi-
nate that unpredictability by suing in a state where the defendant is
present or domiciled.79
In addition, courts and parties have presumably acquired some
skill in applying and predicting the results of the minimum contacts
test by using it over the past thirty years to determine in personam ju-
risdiction over out-of-state defendants. Furthermore, society has been
coping with the detriments of the nonformal test in that portion of the
field of jurisdiction for a long period of time. To the extent that in
personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants has gained impor-
tance in recent years, a decision to retain the formal rules of in rem
and quasi in rem jurisdiction would not produce all the benefits for-
mal rules offer. 80
its insured in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). Now
insurers know that this state interest is part of the minimum contacts calculus, but
they may wonder what the next surprise will be.
77. The Court stated,
It might also be suggested that allowing in rem [and quasi in rem] jurisdiction
avoids the uncertainty inherent in the International Shoe standard . . . . We be-
lieve, however, that the fairness standard of International Shoe can be easily
applied in the vast majority of cases. Moreover, when the existence of jurisdiction
in a particular forum under International Shoe is unclear, the cost of simplifying
the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of "fair
play and substantial justice." That cost is too high.
433 U.S. at 211 (footnote omitted).
78. See note 47 and accompanying text supra; notes 83-84 infra.
79. There is, however, no analogous mitigation of the defendant's predictability
problem under the minimum contacts test.
80. The Court did not consider alternatives to the minimum contacts test. Perhaps
a change in the formal rules could have avoided some of the "incorrect" results while
at the same time retaining the advantages of formality. For example, the Court could
have changed the rules so that property given an artificial situs could not be used as
a basis for jurisdiction. See note 4 supra. The Court could have eliminated only quasi
in rem jurisdiction in which the property is unrelated to the cause of action, leaving
the rest of the property-based rules intact. Note, however, that frequent change in a
formal rule reduces its predictability. Although in many situations other mechanisms
can operate to reduce the occurrence of "incorrect" results within the context of the
formal rules (e.g., the forum non conveniens doctrine and the transfer provisions of
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III. THE FUTURE OF PRESENCE AND DOMICILE AS
JURISDICTIONAL BASES
Many will see in Shaffer v. Heitner an indication that the nonfor-
mal minimum contacts test will soon be applied to other formal juris-
dictional bases.81 Two of the most frequently used jurisdictional
bases-defendant's physical presence and defendant's domi-
cile-currently make use of formal rules. If these rules are supplanted
by a minimum contacts analysis, virtually all the remaining benefits of
formal rules will be lost in the field of jurisdiction and little will be
gained by way of compensation.82 In this Part, presence and domicile
are analyzed simultaneously because, for methodological purposes,
they exhibit some similarities. It must be noted that each type of juris-
dictional basis should (and presumably will) be analyzed separately in
future court opinions.
Currently, the defendant's presence or domicile in a state automati-
cally gives that state jurisdiction over the defendant.8 3 The decision-
making process in these cases clearly makes use of formal rules.8 4
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970)), such mechanisms are ineffective without the coopera-
tion of the court.
8 1. "[T] he mere presence of the defendant. . . is probably insufficient to support
jurisdiction over claims unrelated to his activities within the forum .... " The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 160 (1977). The quoted statement should
be interpreted as a prediction of a future holding rather than a description of the
holding of Shaffer v. Heitner because, by itself, Shaffer should not be read to impose
the minimum contacts test on jurisdiction based on presence or domicile. See notes
46-47 and accompanying text supra.
82. One could envision a minimum contacts test in which presence and domicile
are simply added to the already long list of factors that go into the decisionmaking
process. See notes 27-37 and accompanying text supra. In such a test, presence or
domicile would be just another contact, although probably an important contact.
83. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 28-29 (1971).
84. In a case involving physical presence, the factual inquiry is extremely limited
and simple. If a person is within the boundaries of the state, the state may properly
take jurisdiction over her. Id. § 28 (1971). Courts generally decline jurisdiction if
fraud or coercion is used to obtain presence within the territory of the court or if the
defendant claims an immunity or privilege recognized by the court. Id. §§ 82-83.
Domicile as a basis for jurisdiction is slightly more complex because it may depend
on the person's state of mind. Id. § 18. However, domicile is defined using a very
high level of formality. Id. §§ 11-23. Thus, in most cases it is easy to determine a
person's domicile. But compare In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601
(1934), aff'd sub nom. Dorrance v. Martin, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (per curiam),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936), with In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A.
303 (1932).
Note that courts could have made the determination of a person's domicile a more
nonformal process. For example, domicile could have been defined as the place (any
place?) where a person has certain minimum contacts that make it fair to consider
the person domiciled there. Such a definition of domicile would turn domicile as a
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Because the presence and domicile rules are formal, they exhibit some
of the same detriments that formal rules of property-based jurisdiction
exhibited. 85 In particular, although the rules decide most cases in ac-
cordance with the policy of fairness, they decide some cases "incor-
rectly." 86 However, they probably decide fewer cases "incorrectly"
than did the formal property-based rules. It is possible but quite diffi-
cult to imagine a case in which it would be unfair to sue a defendant
in the state of his domicile.87 It is easier to imagine a case in which it
would be unfair to base jurisdiction on defendant's presence,8 8 but it
is not at all clear that more than a very few such cases occur in prac-
tice.
Similarly, the previously discussed benefits associated with formal
rules also apply to the presence and domicile rules. But again, the
benefits of these rules are greater than the benefits observed in the for-
mal rules of property-based jurisdiction. The presence and domicile
rules approach the ideal for simplicity and predictability. It is very
important for plaintiffs to have the opportunity to choose a jurisdic-
tional basis that is predictable. 89 Retaining the presence and domicile
rules in their present formal state always will allow plaintiffs to pick a
forum in which there is no possibility of successful jurisdictional chal-
lenge.90
It seems clear that the presence and domicile rules, unlike the prop-
erty-based rules, are superior to their nonformal counterparts. Thus, a
court that is asked to apply the minimum contacts test to a
jurisdictional dispute in which the plaintiff seeks to base jurisdiction
on presence or domicile would do well to decline the invitation in fa-
vor of retaining the formal rules. 91
jurisdictional basis into a nonformal decisionmaking process even though domicile
would still automatically trigger proper jurisdiction in the domiciliary state.
85. See Part I-C supra.
86. id.
87. See note 46 supra.
88. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), is universally cited
as such a case.
89. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
90. "This basis of jurisdiction [domicile] assures the existence of a place in which
a person is continuously amenable to suit." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 29, Comment a (1971).
91. Opposition to the use of a nonformal decisionmaking process in a particular
context must not be confused with opposition to the policies and purposes that the
nonformal process seeks to further. A formal rule can often be designed to further
those policies and purposes. See note 23 supra. In the present context, all would agree
with the policy of fairness to defendants, but it is believed that the occasional results
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IV. CONCLUSION
The rules of property-based jurisdiction (as they existed before
Shaffer v. Heitner) and the rules that physical presence and domicile
are valid jurisdictional bases are formal rules, quite closely related in
the sense that they all are used to resolve the same general issue.
Nonetheless, it should come as no great surprise that a methodologi-
cal analysis demonstrates that the property-based rules should be dis-
carded whereas the presence and domicile rules should be retained. It
is not possible to state, in the abstract, that nonformality is inherently
better or worse than formality in making decisions. Each has advan-
tages and disadvantages. Instead, one must consider the case of a
particular type of decision that is to be made, find out what is at
stake, examine the various facts that could be used in making the de-
cision, determine the policies presently at work in the area, and weigh
the benefits of each proposed level of formality92 against the detri-
ments. 93 If the Court employs this mode of analysis when next con-
fronted with the possibility of extending the minimum contacts test, it
will be more likely to choose the level of formality appropriate for
making the decision before it.9 4
Steven E. Cummings
that do not further that policy are outweighed by the benefits of the formal meth-
odology.
92. The foregoing analysis of jurisdictional rules has considered two levels of for-
mality-the very formal rules and the very nonformal minimum contacts test. Other
levels of formality could be imagined. For example, one could modify the presence
rule to exempt persons who are flying over the state. The resulting rule would still
be quite formal, but it would be less formal than the current rule because it would
take one more fact into account.
93. It is, of course, essential to balance all the benefits and detriments of formality
against those of nonformality. It is especially tempting to compare all the benefits of
nonformality with only some of the benefits (and all the detriments) of formality. In
the present context, it has.been argued that "efficient civil process may not be bought
at the expense of unfairness to particular parties." The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 160 (1977). This argument has a certain appeal, but it fails to
take into account the major benefit of formal jurisdictional rules-their predictability.
Although the formal rules may result in some unfairness, the use of a nonformal
decisionmaking process will also result in unfairness due to the unpredictability of
the process. The best that can be done is to strike a balance between formality and
nonformality, taking into account all the benefits and detriments of each.
94. Note that the weighing process in choosing between levels of formality is
itself a nonformal process.
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